· Jane Okafor, Marco Reyes
Securing AI agents before they secure themselves
Agentic systems fail in new ways: prompt injection, tool misuse, data exfiltration. A practical checklist for shipping agents safely.
An agent with tool access is an intern with root. Treat every capability grant as an attack surface.
Threat model at a glance
| Threat | Vector | Severity | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prompt injection | Untrusted content in context | Critical | Boundary markers + output policy checks |
| Tool misuse | Over-broad capability grants | High | Least-privilege allowlists, human-in-the-loop |
| Data exfiltration | Outbound tool calls | High | Egress filtering, DLP on tool responses |
| Memory poisoning | Persisted adversarial state | Medium | Provenance tags, TTL on learned facts |
The checklist
Scope tokens, sandbox execution, log every tool call, and red-team the prompt boundary before launch.
export const policy = {
allowTools: ["search", "read"],
denyTools: ["shell", "email"],
};